6 Reasons to Ban Public Officials Gifts

Speech by John R. Wood to the Oklahoma Ethics Commission, Nov. 14, 2008

Banning gifts intends to ensure that the Oklahoma state legislators and other public servants serve the public interest, and not the special interests.(1) It is critical in our democracy that all Oklahomans believe they can have their voices heard. We want to amplify the people’s voice and reduce the excessive influence of monied lobbyists.

Lobbying is an extension of a business practice for Oklahoma’s 700 lobbyist principals. Gifts are the cost of doing business. Gifts are a part of “quid pro quo.”

• Lobbyists would not spend money on gifts and food if the practice did not influence officials.


• If a bottom-line conscious business gives money to a legislator or state-wide office holder through a lobbyist, there is an expectation to gain either access or favorable legislation.(2) Throwing money away does not make sense from a business point of view.


• Not surprising, expectations are on the rise, as spending on gifts to Oklahoma legislators has increased 28% from the year before.(3)

Polls find more that 75% of Americans want to reduce the influence of lobbyists.(4)

• Lobbyists know “there are as many shady deals and underhanded tactics in Oklahoma as there ever were.”(5) This quote comes from a survey in 2006, where 44% lobbyists in the survey agreed with this statement. If lobbyists think the legislative process is shady, would it be hard to believe constituents think it is too?


• To rebuild the public’s confidence, we need to start now. Society expects individuals to be as free as possible to pursue their economic goals, but also expects that those in positions of public trust should not act in their public capacity on matters in which they have a personal economic interest. Even an appearance of a conflict affects the public’s confidence in office holders generally.


• The acceptance of personal gifts from those who lobby, even when lawful, may give rise to legitimate concerns about favoritism depending on the circumstance.
• Corruption, even perceived, makes citizens lose confidence and become cynical about the government.(6) Ideally, public officials who hold administrative positions are acting impartially in the public interest. However, like anyone else, public officials may respond to political and economic pressures.(7)

Citizen lobbyists and constituents do not have a budget to lobby their state officials.

• When nearly 40% of state lobbyists make more than 6 figures in salary and have budgets to buy gifts and give campaign contributions, there is no way to compete with them.(8)


• How can constituents be expected to compete when money interests can buy lunches, tickets, etc.? Each lobbyist employer is able to spend $100 x 149 legislators or $14,900 total to schmooze legislators from both Oklahoma chambers. When the average Oklahoman makes only $30,000, few constituents can spend this type of money on public office holders.


• Shouldn't constituents have equal access to legislators? Constituents have always been disadvantaged when they lack a budget to give gifts and donate money.


• The 700 lobbyist principals(9) are able to spend more than $10 million dollars total on the state legislature alone to influence them. This assumes a maximum potential of $100 x 149 legislators x 700 lobbyists principals.

Term limits increase lobbyists’ relative power compared to less experienced legislators.(10)

• Oklahoma falls in the category of dominant/complementary, which is the category where lobbyists exhibit the second most powerful tier of influence in the United States and where lobbyists have a great deal of power over term-limited legislators.(11)


• Since legislators have only 12 years in office, few have an institutional memory for understanding of the complexities of the office and therefore, are likely to turn to lobbyists whose job it is to understand the intricacy of their area. This is a good thing in terms of being informed, however, since information is coupled with a lot of money, it is not surprising legislators listen to lobbyists over constituents who do not have money.

Although it is stated that a ban on gifts is a “zero-limit” policy. It is not.

• Amendment 9 preserves 21 exemptions that already exist under current rules.(12)


• These exemptions are much like other exemptions given by other states that ban gifts to legislators from lobbyists. In Oklahoma some exemptions include, but are not limited to
• Plaques and trophies worth less than $200
• “Modest items of food and refreshments, including soft drinks coffee, and donuts.
• Food and beverage consumed on the occasion when participating in a charitable , civil or community event, or when all members of the legislature are invited.”
• Greeting cards
• Anything to be paid back for within 30 days
• Transportation in the performance of official duties.
• Food if an invited guest or if hosted by a government agency
• Nominal gifts under $10

Finally, shouldn’t we let the best ideas win over money, when it comes to talking with our lawmakers?

• When a constituents go to thier legislator, shouldn’t the legislator or state-wide office holder listen? Should money make a difference in how a legislator makes a decision? Whether real or perceived, that decision is tainted in the mind of the public if money is involved. As Oklahomans, we are tired of corruption and compromised logic when it comes to dealing with problems. Let’s work toward an ethics that gives confidence to constituents in the state that our lawmakers are not influenced by lobbyists’ money. Let the marketplace of ideas prevail, not the not bias and favoritism lined with gifts and money.

Mail, email, or call the Oklahoma Ethics Commission before mid-January 2009 when the commission votes on these rules. 2300 N Lincoln Blvd # B5, Oklahoma City, OK 73105, (405) 521-3451 marilyn.hughes@ethics.ok.gov.

1. Oklahoma Constitution, Section V-21: Conflict of interests prohibited - Board on Legislative Compensation. “The Legislature shall enact laws to prohibit members of the Legislature from engaging in activities or having interests which conflict with the proper discharge of their duties and responsibilities.”

2. Administrative Policies& Procdures 3.4 Conflicts of Interest and Outside Activities. Institute for Advanced Studies. Princeton, N.J. http://www.ias.edu/campus/policies/admin/conflicts_of_interests/; “Gill, David & Lipsmeyer, Christine, “Soft Money and Hard Choices: Why Political Parties Might Legislate Against Soft Money Donations”, Public Choice, 123(3-4), 411-438, 2005.

3. 2004-06 from Center for Public Integrity http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/chart.aspx?act=lobbyspending; SUMMARY OF LOBBYIST EXPENDITURES FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 2007. Expenditures of Registered Lobbyists in Oklahoma for the First Half of 2007. http://www.ok.gov/~ethics/; Figures given to the author by Marilyn Hughes’ office.

4. CNN Poll conducted by Opinion Research Corporation. Dec. 15-17, 2006. Adults nationwide.
• “Here are some of the proposals which the Democratic leaders in the U.S. House have promised to address in the first weeks of 2007. For each one, please tell me whether you favor or oppose legislation that would attempt to do each of the following...” N=approx. 500 adults, MoE ± 4.5. “Reducing the amount of influence lobbyists have in congressional decisions.”

• 12/15-17/06 Favor 75%; Oppose 21%; Unsure 4%
• The Harris Poll. Feb. 6-12, 2007. N=1,013 adults nationwide. MoE ± 4.
• “And now a question about the power of different groups in influencing government policy, politicians, and policymakers in Washington. Do you think lobbyists have too much or too little power and influence on Washington?”
• Too Much 79%; Too Little 14%; About Right (vol.) 3%; Unsure 4%

5. Davis, James et al. “Profiles and Stereotypes of Lobbyists in Oklahoma.” Oklahoma Politics. Vol. 15, November 2006: 13.

6. Thompson, Dennis. 1995. Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute.

7. Warren, Mark. E. 2006. “Political Corruption as Duplicitous Exclusion.” Political Science and Politics. October: 803-807.

8. The average Oklahoman cannot afford to retain a lobbyist. The typical annual income from lobbying in Oklahoma is $86,525.6 Nearly 40% of Oklahoma lobbyists make more than $100,000. Davis et al. 2007. “Revisiting Lobbying.” Oklahoma Politics, Vol. 16., November: 124.

9. Marilyn Hughes. Ethics Commission meeting, Oklahoma State Capitol, January 25th, 2008.

10. Rosenthal, Alan. 1992 in Farmer, Rick. 2007. “The 2004 Partisan Transition in the Oklahoma House and Term Limits.” Oklahoma Politics: 22.

11. Thomas, Clive and Ronald Hrebrenar. 1999. “Interest Groups in the States.” Politics in the American States; 122-158.

12. Under Title 257. Ethics Commission. Section 257: 1-1-2 (2) “Anything of value,” “Thing of value” or Things of Value.” Specifically under “These terms do not include: (2) (a) through (u).